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Abstract
The purpose of this Essay is to examine current EU and U.S. approaches to data protection in
the context of the debate about transborder data flows. Part I begins by outlining the EU approach
and the criteria governing data transfers to third countries. Part II examines the scope for self-
regulation by organizations to safeguard personal data. Part III reviews the main features of the
U.S. model of data protection. Then Part IV critically examines several recent U.S. initiatives to
enhance privacy in the light of the EU criteria. This Essay concludes by assessing the potential for
reconciling the discontinuities between the two models.
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INTRODUCTION
The data protection directive' ("directive" or "EU direc-
tive"), which came into effect on October 25, 1998, has given rise
to an intense debate among the European Union ("EU" or
"Union"), the U.S. Administration, and U.S. business aimed at
averting potential restrictions on personal data flows between
Europe and the United States without sacrificing high levels of
privacy protection for individuals. While both the United States
and Union claim to be committed to safeguarding personal pri-
vacy, significant differences exist in determining how this goal is
to be secured. The result of this uncertainty has been increasing
concern among the U.S. business community about the impact
of the directive and claims that its implementation could disrupt
transatlantic trade and business planning, as well as impede the
development of electronic commerce.
The main focus of these concerns is Article 25 of the direc-
tive, which prohibits the transfer of personal data from the
Union to countries that do not possess "adequate" data protec-
tion arrangements, unless certain tightly defined exemptions ap-
ply. The prospect of U.S. businesses having to await the verdict
of EU regulatory bodies before being considered safe destina-
tions for personal data flows has led to suggestions that the
Union is attempting to establish its model of data protection ex-
traterritorially.2 More fundamentally, the debate has high-
* Graham Pearce is a Jean Monnet Lecturer at Aston Business School, Aston Uni-
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1. Council Directive No. 95/46/EC of 24 October 1995 on the Protection of Indi-
viduals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of
Such Data, O.J. L 281/31 (1995) [hereinafter Directive].
2. Alan Westin, Data Protection in the Global Society, Proceedings of Conference
at the Aspen Institute, Berlin 1996, American institute for Contemporary German Stud-
ies, The Johns University (1997).
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lighted important divisions between EU and U.S. approaches to
data protection, which reflect cultural and historical differences
about the role of government regulation. In general, there is a
much greater confidence in public institutions and dependence
upon administrative law in EU Member States than is the case in
the United States, where there is far greater esteem for markets
and technology.3 As a result, data protection in the United
States is perceived by many European observers as being over
reliant on voluntary self-regulation and technological solutions,
while some U.S. analysts perceive the European model as being
unduly heavy handed and bureaucratic.
Despite these differences, there is growing public concern
on both sides of the Atlantic about the impact of the new infor-
mation and communication technologies ("ICT") on privacy.
Moreover, both the Union and the U.S. Administration regard
ICT as crucial in promoting economic growth and perceive pub-
lic confidence in the new technologies as an essential prerequi-
site. In the United States, several recent consumer surveys have
highlighted both a high degree of public concern about privacy
and skepticism about the effectiveness of existing U.S. data pro-
tection practices.4 The outcome has been a spate of initiatives
from both the U.S. Administration and groups of leading U.S.
companies aimed at strengthening privacy safeguards and meet-
ing the EU adequacy criteria. At the same time, however, the
U.S. Administration has expressed doubts about the feasibility of
self-regulation and now envisages greater use of legislation, al-
beit targeted at specific sectors-for example to protect medical
records and children's privacy."*
The purpose of this Essay is to examine current EU and U.S.
approaches to data protection in the context of the debate about
transborder data flows. Part I begins by outlining the EU ap-
proach and the criteria governing data transfers to third coun-
3. Peter Swire & Robert E. Litan, None of Your Business: World Data Flows, Elec-
tronic Commerce and the European Privacy Directive, Brookings Institute, Washington
(1998).
4. Louis HARRIS & ALAN WESTIN, COMMERCE, COMMUNICATIONS AND PRIVACY ON-
LINE: A NATIONAL SURVEY OF U.S. COMPUTER USE, PRIVACY LAws AND AMERICAN BUSINESS
(1997); ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFORMATION CENTER, SURFER BEWARE: PERSONAL PRIVACY
AND THE INTERNET (1997).
5. Vice President Albert Gore Jr., Remarks as prepared for delivery at New York Univer-./
sity commencement (visited Apr. 10, 1999) <http://www.privacyexchange.org/iss/
confpapers/gorespeech.html> (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal).
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tries. Part II examines the scope for self-regulation by organiza-
tions to safeguard personal data. Part III reviews the main fea-
tures of the U.S. model of data protection. Then Part IV
critically examines several recent U.S. initiatives to enhance pri-
vacy in the light, of the EU criteria. This Essay concludes by as-
sessing the potential for reconciling the discontinuities between
the two models.
I. THE EU APPROACH
The European approach is based upon the premise that pri-
vacy is a human right and data protection is an essential means
to protect that right through a coherent and enforceable legal
regime. A comprehensive, public policy approach has been cho-
sen, backed by horizontal administrative law and independent
scrutiny that applies to all organizations, both public and private.
The present EU acquis in the field of data protection takes the
form of the directive, a framework Data Protection Directive, the
impetus for which may be traced back to early national laws from
the 1970s6 and international data protection instruments
adopted in the 1980s.7 The fragmented response to these instru-
ments by EU Member States created a need to harmonize Euro-
pean national data protection laws within the Internal Market,
where the development of international networks was bringing
about a huge increase in cross-border data flows.8 A comple-
mentary Telecommunications Directive sets out specific sectoral
rules to be applied to data protection in the context of telecom-
munication networks,9 while the European Commission Com-
6. Early national data protection laws were adopted in Sweden, Germany, and
France.
7. See Organization for Economic Co-operation and Dev., Recommendation of the
Council Concerning Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of
Personal Data, Sept. 23, 1980, O.E.C.D. Doc. C(80)58 Final, reprinted in 20 I.L.M. 422
(1981); Council of Europe: Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard
to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, opened for signature Jan. 28, 1981, Europ. T.S.
No. 108, reprinted in 20 I.L.M. 317.
8. Graham Pearce & Nicholas Platten, Achieving Personal Data Protection in the Euro-
pean Union, 36J. COMMON MARKET STUD. 529 (1998).
9. Council Directive No. 97/66/EC of the European Parliament and of the Coun-
cil of 15 December 1997 Concerning the Processing of Personal Information and the
Protection of Privacy in the Telecommunications Sector, O.J. L 24/1 (1998) [hereinaf-
ter Telecommunucations Directive].
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munication, a European initiative in electronic commerce, a°
leaves the way open for further measures to address specific data
protection concerns emerging from the development of elec-
tronic commerce.
The directive comprises a mixture of obligations on those
who control the processing of personal data, together with rights
for individuals who are the subject of data processing."a These
basic rules, implemented through national legislation, apply
throughout the Union and have in effect removed all barriers to
the free flow of personal data between EU Member States. A
clear distinction must be drawn, however, between the liberaliz-
ing effect of the directive on intra EU data transfers and its im-
pact on transfers to third, i.e., non-EU countries. The directive
seeks to ensure that the high level of protection within the
Union's borders should not be circumvented in cases where data
processing is being conducted outside the Union, but based
upon personal data originally collected or stored in one of the
Member States.12 Personal data that are undergoing processing
or are intended for processing after transfer to a territory
outside the Union will only be permitted if the country in ques-
tion provides an adequate level of protection, unless an exemp-
tion applies. This mandatory requirement distinguishes the EU
directive from both the Organization of Economic Co-operation
and Development ("OECD") Guidelines and Council of Europe
Convention on data protection, neither of which requires signa-
tory states to restrict data exports to countries that do not pro-
vide similar privacy safeguards. It is this provision that is at the
heart of the current debate between the Union and the United
States.
A. Judging the "Adequacy" of Data Protection in Third Countries
It is common practice for data to be transferred to states
outside the Union for processing. Indeed, over the years, Euro-
pean states have developed procedures for determining those
10. European Commission, A European Initiative in Electronic Commerce, COM
(97) 157 (1997).
11. David Bainbridge & Graham Pearce, EC Data Protection Law, 12 COMPUTER L. &
SECURTY REP. 160 (1996).
12. Spiros Simitis, Foreword to DATA PRIVACY LAw (Joel Reidenberg & Paul Schwartz
eds., 1996).
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circumstances in which data may be transferred.13 The EU di-
rective seeks to harmonize these practices by applying a common
set of rules. Many third countries do not possess any form of
data protection legislation and, even where regulation is present,
it is limited in scope or execution. Nonetheless, the adequacy
principle is not intended to compel third countries to apply reg-
ulations that are identical in formal or substantive terms to the
EU model-data protection may be achieved in different ways.
B. A Prototype Approach
The EU directive sets forth in Article 25 (2) a non-exhaustive
list of factors to be taken into account when judging the ade-
quacy of protection in third countries, from which it is clear that
the objective is not to secure "equivalence" but to establish
whether data protection principles are in place.'" In essence,
this provision requires an assessment of both the relevant data
protection rules and the effectiveness of these instruments.
Building on the text of the directive, the "Article 29 Group," the
Working Party established by the directive comprising Data Pro-
tection Commissioners from each EU state and EU Commission
officials, has prepared a set of First Orientations on transfers of
personal data to third countries: Possible ways forward in assess-
ing adequacy 5 ("Adequacy Paper"), which sets out a prototype
approach for judging adequacy. This approach has been refined
in a "synthesis" document regarding the manner in which Arti-
cles 25 and 26 of the directive should be applied. 6 It provides a
methodology for assessing the level of third country protection
and outlines the issues that are likely to arise from its applica-
tion.
13. Scott Blackmer, Transborder Personal Data Flows: Administrative Practice, Briefing
Report for Privacy and American Business Meeting on Model Data Protection Contracts and Laws
(visited Apr. 10, 1999) <http://idt.net/-pab/bio.htm> (on file with the Fordham Inter-
national Law Journal).
14. Directive, supra note 1, art. 25(2), O.J. L 281/31, at 45-46 (1995).
15. European Commission, Directorate General XV, Working Party on the Protec-
tion of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data, First Orientations on
Transfers of Personal Data to Third Countries - Possible Ways Forward in Assessing
Adequacy, XV D/5020/97-EN Final, adopted on June 26, 1997.
16. European Commission, Directorate General XV, Working Party on the Protec-
tion of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data, Transfers of Per-
sonal Data to Third Countries: Applying Articles 25 and 26 of the EU Data Protection
Directive, XV D/5025/98, adopted on July 24, 1998 [hereinafter Transfers of Personal
Data to Third Countries].
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The Working Group documents cite the principles to be
used in appraising the adequacy of protection in a third country.
These principles fall into two categories, reflecting the func-
tional approach envisaged by the EU data protection model: the
content of the rules protecting personal data on the one hand,
and the mechanisms to ensure their effective application on the
other. The objective is to assess the fundamental elements of
the protection afforded. The principles are summarized below.
" The purpose limitation principle. Data should be processed
for a specific purpose and subsequently used or further
communicated only insofar as this process is compatible
with the purpose of the transfer. The only exemptions to
this rule would be those necessary in a democratic society,
for example national security or the investigation of crim-
inal offences.
* The data quality and proportionality principle. Data should
be accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date. The
data should be adequate, relevant, and not excessive in
relation to the purposes for which they are transferred or
further processed.
* The transparency principle. Individuals should be provided
with information as to the purpose of the processing and
the identity of the data controller in the third country,
and other information insofar as this information is nec-
essary to ensure fairness.
" The security principle. Technical and organizational secur-
ity measures should be taken that are appropriate to the
risks presented by the processing. Any person acting
under the authority of the data controller must not pro-
cess data except on instructions from the controller.
" The rights of access, rectification, and opposition. The data
subject should have a right to obtain a copy of all data
relating to him or her that are processed and a right to
rectification of those data where they are shown to be in-
accurate. In certain situations, he or she should also be
able to object to the processing of the data relating to him
or her.
* Restrictions on onward transfers. Transfers of personal data
from the recipient to another third party should not be
permitted, unless a means is found of contractually bind-
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ing the third party in question, thereby providing the
same data protection guarantees to the data subjects.
This final principle is intended to prevent the controllers of per-
sonal data from using a country with "adequate" provisions as a
"staging post" for onward transfers to a country without ade-
quate safeguards to evade the protection afforded by the direc-
tive.
In addition, the approach highlights some transfers as pos-
ing particular risks to privacy and which, therefore, may merit
special attention, for example:
* transfers of sensitive data, including medical records or data
pertaining to personal, political, or religious beliefs,
* automated individual decisions, where the purpose of the
transfer is the taking of an automated decision, for exam-
ple,. in the case of assessment of credit worthiness-the
individual should have the right to know the logic in-
volved in this decision and be able to challenge it, and
* direct marketing, where data are transferred for the pur-
poses of direct marketing, the data subject should be able
to "opt-out" from having his or her data used for such
purposes at any stage.
II. TRANSFERS TO THIRD, COUNTRIES-
ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS
A. Exemptions 4
Article 26(1) of the EU directive allows the possibility of ex-
emptions from the requirement for adequate protection. Views
on the potential usefulness of these exemptions, however, differ.
Some industry commentators, perhaps unsurprisingly, have
taken the view that large numbers of transfers may be covered by
the various options set out in Article 26(1). Conversely, the Arti-
cle 29 Group has underlined the need to adopt a restrictive ap-
proach in their interpretation and application.
The first of these exemptions covers cases where the data
subject gives his or her consent unambiguously to the proposed
transfer. Consent must be freely given, specific, and informed.
Logic would seem to dictate that in this context "informed con-
sent" will require data subjects to be properly informed of the
particular risk that his or her data are to be transferred to a
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country lacking adequate protection. If this information is not
provided, this exemption will not apply. Because the consent
must be unambiguous, any doubt about the fact that consent has
been given would also be liable to render the exemption inappli-
cable. An implied consent, for example, where an individual has
been made aware of a transfer and has not objected, would not
qualify for this exemption.
The second and third exemptions cover transfers necessary
either for the performance of a contract between the data sub-
ject and the controller or for the conclusion or performance of a
contract concluded in the interest of the data subject between the
controller and a third party. These exemptions appear generous
but are likely, according to the Article 29 Group, to be limited by
the requirement that all of the data transferred must be neces-
sary for the performance of the contract. Thus, if additional
non-essential data are transferred or if some of the data are in
fact transferred for follow-up marketing rather than the strict
performance of the contract, the exemption will be lost. Despite
these caveats, these two exemptions will have an impact. They
are often likely to be applicable, for example, to those transfers
necessary to reserve an airline ticket for a passenger or to trans-
fers of personal data necessary for the operation of an interna-
tional bank or credit card payment.
The fourth exemption has two strands. The first covers
transfers necessary or legally required on important public interest
grounds. This strand may cover certain transfers between public
administrations, for example between tax or customs administra-
tions or services responsible for social security.17 Care, however,
must be taken not to interpret this provision too widely; a simple
public interestjustification for a transfer does not suffice; it must
be a question of important public interest. The second strand
concerns transfers in the context of international litigation or
legal proceedings necessary for the establishment, exercise, or de-
fense of legal claims.
The fifth exemption concerns transfers necessary to protect
the vital interests of the data subject, for example the urgent trans-
fer of medical records to a third country where a EU citizen had
become dangerously ill. Recital 31 of the directive, however, de-
fines vital interest narrowly, as an interest "which is essential for
17. Directive, supra note 1, recitals para. 58, O.J. L 281/31, at 37 (1995).
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the data subject's life." This phrasing would seem to exclude,
for example, financial, property, or family interests.
The final exemption concerns transfers made from registers
intended by law for consultation by the public. The intention is
that where a register in a Member State is available for public
consultation or by persons demonstrating a legitimate interest,
for example via the Internet, then the fact that the person con-
sulting the register is located in a third country and that the act
of consultation in fact involves a data transfer, should not stand
in the way of the ability of the person to consult the register.
Nonetheless, Recital 58 makes it clear that entire registers or cat-
egories of data from registers should not be permitted to be
transferred under this exemption. The mass transfer of public
register data for commercial purposes or the trawling of publicly
available data for the purpose of profiling specific individuals
would not, therefore, benefit from the exemption.
B. Contractual Solutions
An exemption of a different sort is included in Article 26(2)
of the EU directive, following which Member States may author-
ize specific third country transfers if the data controller adduces
adequate safeguards by way of a contract. The idea is that a com-
pany in a third country might provide contractual guarantees to
the organization transferring the data from the Union regarding
the protection to be given to the data transferred. Thus, trans-
fers could take place even where there are no enforceable indus-
try codes and the country has not adopted adequate privacy safe-
guards. The approach has attracted the attention of the U.S.
business community. The International Chamber of Commerce
has prepared model clauses for contracts governing the interna-
tional transfer of personal data "which it believes could avoid the
looming threat of a transatlantic cyber war."18
The application of contracts for transborder transfers has
been examined by the Article 29 Group, which, while acknowl-
edging their role, has also drawn attention to their potential
shortcomings. 9 For example, the law in a third country may re-
18. INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, ICC MODEL CLAUSES FOR USE IN CON-
TRACTS INVOLVING TRANSBORDER DATA FLOWS (1998); Francis Williams, Data Protection
Plans for Electronic Commerce, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1998.
19. European Commission, Directorate General XV, Working Party on the Protec-
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quire that the disclosure of information takes precedence over a
contract, and individuals may find it difficult to investigate cases
of non-compliance in third countries where there are no supervi-
sory bodies. The Article 29 Group believes that the adequacy of
a contractual solution should be judged in the same way as any
more generally applied regulatory or non-regulatory system of
data protection-it should embody a core set of data protection
principles and render them enforceable. In practice, the Article
29 Group suggests, the contractual solution may be best suited to
those situations where data transfers are similar and repetitive,
for example credit card transactions, airline reservations, or in-
ternal company transfers and where parties to the contract are
large multinational operators subject to public scrutiny and reg-
ulation. Some independent commentators, however, are skepti-
cal as to whether, in the absence of industry codes, individual
contracts are able to meet the adequacy criteria even in these
situations. °
C. White Lists
Given the number of transfers of personal data leaving the
Community on a daily basis and the multitude of actors involved,
it will not be possible for EU data protection authorities to ex-
amine each case in detail. This stark reality has led the Article
29 Group to turn its attention towards the type of mechanisms
that will need to be developed to rationalize the decision-making
process for large numbers of cases, allowing decisions, or at least
provisional decisions, to be made without undue difficulty, de-
lays, or excessive costs. Although procedures for dealing with
data transfers will vary from one Member State to another, the
Article 29 Group has proposed that at Community level a "white
list" of third countries, to whom it could be assumed transfers of
personal data would be safe, be developed.2 ' Such a list may be
"provisional" or "for guidance only" and, therefore, without prej-
tion of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data, Preliminary Views
on the Use of Contractual Provisions in the Context of Transfers of Personal Data to
Third Countries, XV D/5005/98, adopted on Apr. 22, 1998.
20. Graham Greenleaf, A Proposed Privacy Code for Asia-Pacific Cyberlaw, 2 J. COM-
PUTER MEDIATED COMMUNICATIONS 1 (visited Apr. 10, 1999) <http://shum.huji.ac.il/
jcmc/vol2/issuel/asiapac.html# RTFToCI> (on file with the Fordham International Law
Journal).
21. Transfers of Personal Data to Third Countries, supra note 16.
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udice to cases that might raise particular concerns. The inclu-
sion of a country in a white list would be based upon individual
cases, rather than a simplified and abstract appreciation of a
legal text or code. Once several representative cases of transfers
to a particular third country have been considered, and for each
it has been judged that the protection afforded was adequate,
the country could be white listed.
First, this approach has the potential to afford a degree of
legal certainty to organizations regarding those countries that
could be considered as generally ensuring adequate protection.
Second, it would provide a clear and public incentive to those
third countries still in the process of developing their data pro-
tection systems. Third, a list at a Community level would help
establish a coherent approach and prevent the emergence of dif-
fering and perhaps conflicting white lists among data protection
authorities in EU States.
The adoption of a white list is not, however, without its diffi-
culties. Principal among them is that many third countries do
not have uniform protection in all economic sectors. In the
United States, the situation is even more complex in that specific
laws exist only in, certain areas, such as credit reporting and
video rental records. An added difficulty arises in countries with
federal constitutions like Australia, Canada, the United States,
and Switzerland, where differences often exist between the vari-
ous states or provinces that make up the federation. As a conse-
quence, it would be impossible, at present, to include very many
third countries on a white list, which limits its usefulness in terms
of providing the legal certainty desired. A further risk is that
some third countries might come to see non-inclusion on a
white list as a politically provocative step and might misconstrue
non-inclusion as a judgement on their data protection system.
Despite these drawbacks, the need for such a list remains,
and it is likely one will be developed even if, for reasons of pres-
entation, it is not referred to as a white list. Moreover, it might
not be limited to countries possessing horizontal data protection
laws, but could include specific sectors where data protection is
deemed adequate. This approach is likely to be favored in the
United States where sectoral approaches are the norm. In effect,
countries could be "partially" white-listed to cover a broad mass
of transfers, but not necessarily in every case.
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D. Self-regulation
The functional approach to evaluating adequate protection
advocated by the Article 29 Group and the European Commis-
sion deliberately leaves open the possibility that, theoretically at
least, adequacy could be delivered by industry self-regulation,
rather than law. The acceptance by the Union that law is not a
pre-requisite of adequacy has opened up the possibility that busi-
nesses in countries such as the United States, where government
regulation is restricted, could nevertheless be considered safe
destinations for international data flows if they were to develop
industry codes incorporating veritable personal data protection.
Self-regulation is a broad term encompassing a wide range
of different arrangements. At its best, it can offer real guaran-
tees that an industry complies in practice with a particular set of
rules; backed by genuinely dissuasive sanctions and a quasi-judi-
cial complaints procedure. At its worst, it is pure window' dress-
ing. For the Article 29 Group, any evaluation of self-regulatory
mechanisms should begin by an examination of the content of
the data protection code or instruments and how they are to be
applied in practice. The core principles of a self-regulatory code
are unlikely to pose major problems in terms of evaluation, but
determining how they will work in practice is far more challeng-
ing. Furthermore, difficulties may arise, particularly for consum-
ers, when several different codes are adoptedby competing rep-
resentative bodies within the same industry or sector.
To help avoid some of these difficulties; the Union and
United States are currently exploring the possibility of agreeing
on a benchmark set of enforceable data protection principles
that companies must adhere to and respect if they wish to bene-
fit from a presumption that they are a safe destination for ex-
porting personal data from the Union. From a EU perspective,
it is important that any such benchmark guarantees respect for
the principles contained in the OECD Guidelines and, given the
U.S. reliance on industry self-regulation, the European Commis-
sion is seeking to ensure the presence of mechanisms that will
guarantee effective enforcement of these rules.22
22. Ulf Brfihann, The International Scene and the EU Directive: 5 Weeks Before
Its Entry into Force, Address Before the Twentieth International Conference of Privacy
and Data Protection Commissioners in Santiago de Compostela (Sept. 15-17, 1998).
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III. THE U.S. APPROACH
Interest in the "information superhighway" has expanded
rapidly in the United States over recent years. Indeed, because
of the links between ICT and economic development, the U.S.
Administration has come to regard its promotion as a key objec-
tive, central to which is the need to safeguard the privacy of per-
sonal data. There appears, therefore, to be a good deal of com-
mon ground between the Europeans and the Americans on this
issue. The Americans, however, are cautious about supporting
federal data protection legislation, unless they are convinced
that the risks involved are indisputable and there is genuine evi-
dence of market failure. Where action has been initiated, it has
been in the form of segmental initiatives involving a patchwork
of rules including constitutional, common, statutory, and regula-
tory laws.2 3 A diversity of regimes exists at federal and state
levels, which apply to some groups of businesses, but not others,
while other rules only pertain to federal or state governments.
Despite an aversion to federal involvement, privacy issues
have begun to arouse public and political interest in the United
States. The Electronic Privacy Information Center ("EPIC")
found that of 100 "top" web sites in the United States, only sev-
enteen percent met basic standards of privacy protection, while
Business Week recently reported that seventy-two percent of on-
line users would use the Internet more if they felt that the pri-
vacy of their personal data and communications were
respected.24 An Act to Protect Children's Online Privacy was
adopted by the U.S. Congress in October 1998,25 while the Ben-
nett-Jeffords Bill on the protection of medical records remains
outstanding. Moreover, the U.S. Administration has recently
produced a number of reports dealing with the privacy of per-
sonal data, but each has emphasized self-regulation and volunta-
rism. 26 "Governments should adopt a non-regulatory, market
23. See John F. Mogg, Comments to the European-American Business Council (visited
Apr. 10, 1999) <http://www.privacyexchange.org/iss/confpapers/Mogg98.html> (on
file with the Fordham International Law Journal).
24. ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFORMATION CENTER, supra note 4; Heather Green et al.,
A Little Privacy Please, Bus. WK., Mar. 16, 1998, at 98.
25. H.R. 3783, 105th Cong. (1998) (Children's Online Privacy Protection Act).
26. Richard S. Rosenberg, Privacy Protection on the Internet: The Marketplace Versus the
State (visited Apr. 10, 1999) <http://www.ntia.gov/ntia/privacy/files> (on file with the
Fordham International Law Journal).
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lead approach to electronic commerce .... [N] ew and unneces-
sary regulations, bureaucratic procedures on commercial activi-
ties . . .should be avoided and where government action is
needed it should be to support and enforce a predictable, mini-
malist, consistent and simple legal environment for com-
merce."27 The preference is for a decentralized, contractual
model of law rather than one based upon top-down regulation,
of the form adopted in Europe. Even in its most recent pro-
nouncements, the United States remains steadfastly committed
to private sector solutions for the implementation of consumer
friendly, self-regulatory privacy.
To help encourage the development of ICT, in 1993 the Ad-
ministration established a federal agency-the National Infor-
mation Infrastructure Task Force ("NII").28 In 1995, the NII
adopted a core set of data protection principles intended for
horizontal application across all sectors of the U.S. economy. 29
These principles were close to the standards set in both the EU
directive and the OECD Guidelines, however, they have yet to be
adopted as federal government policy. In April 1997, spurred
on by developments in the Union and Canada, the NII outlined
several alternative approaches for securing data protection, in-
cluding an enhanced segmental approach, based upon existing
arrangements, but with additional controls in certain sensitive
areas and a federal privacy entity, with or without a regulatory
function. ° This announcement was followed in January 1998 by
a further consultation document, Elements of Effective Self-reg-
ulation for Protection of Privacy" l ("Elements Paper"), aimed at
encouraging a more discriminating approach to data protection
among the U.S. business community and setting out for the first
time the specific principles required in any self-regulatory re-
27. PRESIDENT WILLIAM J. CLINTON & VICE PRESIDENT ALBERT GORE, JR., A FRAME-
WORK FOR GLOBAL ELECTRONIC COMMERCE (1997).
28. Steven Saxby, Public Sector Policy and the Information Highway, 2 J.L. & INFO.
TECH. 221 (1994).
29. INFORMATION POLICY COMMITTEE, NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE
TASK FORCE, PRINCIPLES FOR PROVIDING AND USING PERSONAL INFORMATION (1995).
30. INFORMATION POLICY COMMITTEE, NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE
TASK FORCE, OPTIONS FOR PROMOTING PRIVACY ON THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRA-
STRUCTURE (1997).
31. Elements of Effective Self-Regulation for Protection of Privacy (visited June 29,
1999) <http://ntia.doc.gov/reports/privacydraft/198dftprin.htm> (on file with the
Fordham International Law Journal).
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gime. In November 1998, the Department of Commerce
("DOC") released a new consultation document, the Interna-
tional Safe Harbor Principles, ("Safe Harbor Principles") which
firmed up the earlier Elements Paper into a benchmark stan-
dard to which U.S. companies could self-certify, the hope of the
U.S. Administration being that the Union would be able to ac-
cept this standard as adequate. 2
Over the past two years, U.S. business has also taken a more
active interest in privacy issues. In 1996, the Electronic Frontier
Foundation linked with CommerceNet to establish eTRUST
(TRUSTe from June 1997), including agreement on a series of
protocols aimed at establishing global trust and standards in the
Internet. A year later, a number of major U.S. companies, in-
cluding Netscape, Microsoft, and IBM, announced their inten-
tions to enhance privacy in the online environment by establish-
ing an Open Profiling Standard ("OPS") to provide for secure
transmission of personal data. In July 1998, the Online Privacy
Alliance, comprising a wide range of U.S business interests, an-
nounced its commitment to a privacy seal and an online privacy
dispute resolution program. 33 The Better Business Bureau On-
line ("BBBOnline")-a body backed by a further coalition of
leading U.S. companies-has also announced its intention to de-
velop a self-regulation initiative to protect consumer privacy on
the Internet. 4 Its draft program, established in June 1998, cre-
ates a privacy seal together with procedures for resolving con-
sumer complaints.
Anxious to support self-regulation and avert legislation,
these initiatives were warmly welcomed by the U.S. Administra-
tion. Indeed, following the launch of the Online Privacy Alli-
ance, Undersecretary of Commerce David Aaron stated on July
28, 1998, that he believed that all the elements of effective pri-
vacy policies were now in place and that the way was now open to
32. Department of Commerce, Task Force on Electronic Commerce, International
Safe Harbor Principles (visited on Apr. 10, 1999) <http://www.ita.doc.gov/ecom/
aaronl 14.html> (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal).
33. Online Privacy Alliance, Effective Enforcement and Self-regulation (visited Apr. 10,
1999) <http://www.privacyalliance.org/resources/enforcement.shtml> (on file with
the Fordham International Law Journal).
34. Better Business Bureau Online, BBBOnline Privacy Policy (visited Apr. 10, 1999)
<http://www.bbbonline.org/privacy/index.html> (on file with. the Fordham Interna-
tional Law Journal).
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confirm that U.S. companies that validate these policies will
meet the U.S. administration's privacy requirements.
IV. EVALUATION OF RECNT U.S. APPROACHES
In order to illustrate the tensions between the EU and U.S.
models of data protection, the proposals of the DOC and the
BBB Online have been examined in the context of the content
and enforcement principles set out in the Adequacy Paper pre-
pared by the EU Article 29 Group. A third initiative, which re-
lates specifically to safeguarding the privacy of personal data on
the Internet and which involves several major U.S. companies
and the World Wide Web Consortium ("W3C"), is also investi-
gated.
A. Department of Commerce
The Elements Paper35 was intended as a consultation docu-
ment for U.S. business and comprised a description of the level
of protection that is considered effective and a discussion of the
principles that might make up effective self-regulation. Perhaps
quite deliberately, it lacked clarity both in structure and lan-
guage as to those provisions that are essential or optional and
which requirements are alternatives or cumulative obligations.
1. Principles of Fair Information Practices
In contrast to the EU approach, which is based upon the
general application of the stated criteria, the DOC document is
limited to data relating to consumers and implies that it may
only be relevant in the online context. The need to ensure that
individuals are provided with information about the purposes of
data processing-the transparency principle-is partly met by
the awareness principle in the DOC document. Nonetheless,
there is a potentially significant distinction here. The EU ade-
quacy standard envisages an ,active duty to provide information
individually to the data subject, whereas the DOC paper implies
that it .is sufficient. merely to make the information available.
Similarly, while the choice principle in the DOC document is
relatively clearly stated, it does not include a requirement to
35. Department of Commerce, supra note 31.
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specify the purpose for which data are collected before the time
of collection, which is an OECD Guidelines requirement.
There are also significant differences between the rights of
access, rectification, and opposition to processing, referred to in
the EU document, and the DOC consumer access principles.
Crucially, the DOC recognizes that the consumer has a right
only to "reasonable" access to their data, which falls well below
the EU standard. Regarding the right of rectification, the Ade-
quacy Paper grants this "where data are shown to be inaccurate,"
whereas the DOC paper limits it to the rather less precise notion
of "where necessary." The right of opposition is catered for by
the U.S. paper's choice principle, which establishes a right of
opt-out. The Union aims to restrict onward transfers of data un-
less certain safeguards are in place, but this restriction is dealt
with in only a discursive manner in the DOC paper and then
only in relation to security.
The U.S. paper meets the adequacy criteria in recognizing
that data should be accurate, relevant, and not be excessive in
relation to the purposes for which it is to be collected. The for-
mer refers to the need for accuracy of "the extent necessary for
the purpose" and while the Adequacy Paper makes no such ca-
veat, the EU directive itself refers to "reasonable steps" being
necessary to ensure accuracy. The data security principle, which
is expressed in more forceful language than is used elsewhere in
the DOC document, approximates to the corresponding princi-
ple in the EU adequacy standard.
The EU paper requires that additional safeguards, such as,
the need for explicit consent, are required in respect to the
processing of sensitive data. The DOC paper, however, takes a
more restrained stance and simply states that "affirmative
choice," or opt-in, may be appropriate for certain kinds of infor-
mation, such as medical data or data about children. This stance
represents a sharp difference of approach from the specific crite-
ria established in Article 8 of the EU directive.3 6 The direct mar-
keting opt-out seems to be covered by the choice principle in the
DOC paper. It remains unclear, however, whether the individ-
ual has the right to opt out at any time, not only at the time of
collection or within a time limit of being informed. Moreover,
while the EU directive seeks to ensure that individuals have the
36. Directive, supra note 1, art. 8, O.J. L 281/31, at 40-41 (1995).
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right to know the logic of any decisions about them taken by
automatic means, the U.S. paper makes no reference to such a
provision.
2. Enforcement Mechanisms
The DOC document states that the basic principle of an ef-
fective regime should include "mechanisms to assure compli-
ance with the rules and appropriate recourse to an injured party
when rules are not followed.""7 This provision implies that there
are two objectives for the mechanisms. It is also suggested that
they may take a variety of forms and that business may need to
adopt "more than one," but it is unclear whether they are merely
a menu of possibilities, one or more of which may be applied. It
is left to the organization itself to design the means that best suit
its needs and those of its customers.
The EU paper refers to the need for a good level of compli-
ance with the data protection principles and this compliance can
be broadly equated with the DOC's paper's requirement for con-
sequences and its suggestions regarding rectification. It is far
from clear, however, whether "meaningful consequences" are
comparable with the Adequacy Paper's "effective and dissuasive
sanctions." The need to offer individuals support and help in
dealing with data protection issues is dealt with under the con-
sumer recourse principle, which suggests that companies should
offer consumers mechanisms that are readily available and af-
fordable to resolve complaints and disputes. Nonetheless, the
element of independent investigation inherent in the Adequacy
Paper is missing. The EU paper also stresses redress, independ-
ent arbitration, compensation to the injured party, and the im-
position of sanctions. The DOC paper makes no reference to
independent adjudication, arbitration, or compensation.
B. The Better Business Bureau Online
1. Nature and Scope
This scheme is a self-regulatory initiative aimed at the pro-
tection of personal data in the online context. To be part of the
program a company must maintain a U.S.-based website and
adopt a privacy policy containing certain required elements.
37. Department of Commerce, supra note 31.
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There is some possibility of using the "deceptive practice" provi-
sions of the Federal Trade Commission Act against a website that
professes to comply with a declared privacy policy, but fails to do
so in practice. This aspect is, however, a general possibility and
not a particular feature of the BBBOnLine program. Nonethe-
less, BBBOnLine does envisage a system of compliance assess-
ment and the possibility of independent arbitration.
There are no explicit exemptions or restrictions in the pro-
gram requirements. There is an implied restriction of the pur-
pose/transparency provisions to data collected from the individ-
ual online, i.e., exclusion of data collected from third parties,
and the access principle similarly covers only data collected on-
line from the individual. The program requirements apply only
to individually identifiable data, an expression intended to ex-
clude data collected invisibly via cookies or other web protocols.
In some EU Member States, such "invisible" data is considered as
personal data.
2. Principles of Fair Information Practices
The purpose limitation principle does not exist in any clear
form under the BBBOnline scheme. The privacy policy of par-
ticipating companies must disclose the intended uses of individ-
ually identifiable information, but there is no prohibition on us-
ing the information later for uses not intended at the time of
collection. There is a requirement to inform individuals about
any choices that they have regarding the uses and disclosures of.
the data, but no requirement to provide such choices, except in
relation to disclosures for marketing purposes. As regards other
elements of the data quality principles, e.g., proportionality, par-
ticipants in the program must ensure that information collected
online is accurate, complete, and timely for the purpose that it is
to be used. With regard to transparency, there-is a requirement
to provide information about the identity of the collector of the
information, its intended uses, and the choices that individuals
have about the way that information is used and disclosed. Only
with regard to disclosures to third parties for marketing pur-
poses, however, is the provision of choice a requirement. The
individual would receive no information about disclosures to
third parties for non-marketing purposes.
There is a general issue regarding the manner in which data
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subjects are furnished with information. The requirement is to
provide information in a privacy policy displayed on the web-
site's home or entry page and linked to any page on which the
site collects identifiable data. The probable effect of these provi-
sions is that the individual user will have to click upon a "privacy
policy" icon to be able to see the information. Information is
therefore available, but not actively provided.
The BBBOnline scheme does, however, include a require-
ment to provide individuals with access to individually identifiable
information collected from them online. This requirement ex-
cludes data collected from third parties or public sources. Ar-
guably, the right of rectification is broader-a requirement on
participants to establish effective and easy to use mechanisms to
permit individuals access to correct inaccurate information. The
right to object to the use of data for direct marketing purposes
applies only to communication of data to third parties. There is
no opt-out from the website using its own data for sending mar-
keting material.
In respect of security, participants must take reasonable
steps to ensure that individually identifiable data collected on-
line is secure from unauthorized access. There are no require-
ments regarding other security issues, such as unauthorized or
accidental disclosure or loss of data. Moreover, there are no spe-
cific requirements regarding sensitive categories of data, and,
apart from the requirement to provide an opt-0ut from disclo-
sufbs to third parties for marketing purposes, there are no con-
ditions concerning the onward transfer of data to third parties
not governed by the BBBOnLine program or an equivalent
scheme.
3. Enforcement Mechanisms
The award of the privacy seal depends on prospective par-
ticipants successfully completing BBBOnLine's "Privacy compli-
ance assessment process." This process is understood to include
a serious "form-filling" exercise through which companies show
how they intend to conform with the program's requirements.
The process must be repeated annually. With respect to con-
sumer complaints, BBBOnLine has established a Privacy Policy
Dispute Resolution Program, involving conciliation, mediation,
and ultimately arbitration, and participants agree to abide by its
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decisions. The scheme seeks, however, to be corrective, rather
than a means by which individuals will be able to obtain compen-
sation. Consumers will be able to bring complaints by e-mail or
free telephone line. The company concerned will be able to ta-
ble written evidence to which the consumer may respond. But
BBBOnLine does not have its own investigative powers, and its
decision about complaints will be based upon the written evi-
dence before it. Appeals are possible. The consequences of a
failure by a company to respect a decision would be removal of
the seal and public identification of the company concerned,
although some BBBOnLine statements have intimated that these
measures might only be taken against repeat offenders. Referral
to the appropriate government agency, e.g. the Federal Trade
Commission or OCC, is also promised for serious or frequent
offenders. Complaints against companies not part of the pro-
gram will also be heard, but clearly the sanction of seal removal
would not be applicable in these cases. Such non-BBBOnLine
companies would also be judged only against their own pub-
lished policies, not the BBB OnLine program.
In some ways the BBBOnline scheme improves significantly
on the DOC's Elements Paper and subsequent safe harbor pro-
posals. It includes a clear and unequivocal requirement to pro-
vide subject access to all identifiable data collected from individ-
uals. The program has a compliance verification element that
goes beyond simple self-certification, and there is a relatively
user-friendly dispute resolution system. By EU standards, how-
ever, the purpose principle remains weak, and, as with the Safe
Harbor Principles, there is no real protection in respect of data
collected from third parties or public sources. Onward transfer
to non-participating companies is also a problem. With respect
to enforcement, the independence of BBBOnLine as an arbiter
is not clear, and there are no real powers of investigation into
complaints. Moreover, the system fails to provide for the award-
ing of damages to data subjects.
C. Platform for Privacy Preferences and the Open Profiling Standard
The debate about comparative privacy standards in the
Union and United States is taking place against a background of
rapid technological change. In the absence of an international
consensus on the legal measures needed to manage global data
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flows, those responsible for designing and managing the archi-
tecture of the new technologies have begun to develop techno-
logical solutions to privacy protection. The work of the W3C,
which includes Microsoft and Netscape among its members, is
indicative of this trend. The consortium is currently developing
a filtering technology to enable Internet users to regulate their
own access to websites on the basis of their own privacy prefer-
ences. The approach is one that combines market-based and
technological solutions by which Internet users will be provided
with control over how much personal information is collected
and used online. The Platform for Privacy Preferences Project
("P3P") conceives of privacy and data protection as something to
be agreed between the Internet user whose data are collected
and the website that collects the data. It is based on users con-
senting to the collection of his personal data by a site-the Open
Profiling Standard ("OPS") is intended to provide for secure
transmission of a standard profile of personal data-provided
that the site's declared privacy practices, such as the purposes for
which data are collected and whether data are passed on to third
parties, satisfy the user's requirements.
The technical protocols now being developed by the W3C
will have a direct impact on the level of privacy enjoyed by on-
line users for years to come. In June 1998, the Article 29 Work-
ing Group produced an opinion on the project setting out a
number of reservations. It stated that in Europe the new proto-
cols, likely to be included in the next generation of Internet
software browsers, are viewed as an opportunity to extend In-
ternet privacy. 38 It voiced concern, however, that if not devel-
oped and implemented carefully, the new protocols could po-
tentially diminish levels of protection for European citizens, be-
come a source of legal confusion, and provide only limited
protection to a small number of informed Internet users. Essen-
tially, the consortium has sought to develop a single vocabulary
through which a user's preferences and a website's practices are
articulated. The possibility of adapting this vocabulary to the
needs and regulatory context of specific geographic regions,
however, is not envisaged.
38. European Commission, Directorate General XV, Working Party on the Protec-
tion of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data, Opinion 1/98: Plat-
form for Privacy Preferences (P3P) and the Open Profiling Standard (OPS), XV D/
5032/98, adopted on June 16, 1998.
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The Union's view is that a technical platform for privacy
protection will not in itself be sufficient to protect privacy on the
Web. It must be applied within the context of a framework of
enforceable data protection rules, which provide a minimum
and non-negotiable level of privacy protection for all individuals.
The use of P3P, in the absence of such a framework, risks shift-
ing the onus primarily onto the individual user to protect him-
self, a development that would undermine the internationally es-
tablished principle that it is the data controller who is responsi-
ble for complying with data protection standards. Such an
inversion of responsibility also assumes a level of knowledge
about the risks posed by data processing to individual privacy
that cannot realistically be expected of most citizens.
There is also a risk that P3P, once implemented in the next
generation of browsing software, could mislead EU-based opera-
tors into believing that they can be discharged of certain of their
legal obligations-for example granting individual users a right
of access to their data, if the individual user consents to this as
part of the online negotiation. In fact, those businesses, organi-
zations, and individuals established within the Union and provid-
ing services over the Internet will in any case be required to fol-
low the rules established in the EU directive as implemented in
national law as regards any personal data that they collect and
process. P3P might, thus, cause confusion not only among oper-
ators as to their obligations, but also among Internet users as to
the nature of their data protection rights. Browsing software
that is distributed within the Union will, therefore, need to be
designed and configured so as to ensure that online agreements
that contradict the prevailing data protection laws in a particular
country are not possible.
For users based in the Union and contacting with websites
established in non-EU countries, the prime concern is that the
organization to whom they are providing personal data might
not be subject to the EU directive or any adequate set of effec-
tively implemented data protection rules. Crucial to the deci-
sion of whether to provide data to such sites will be not only the
approximate content of any applicable rules, but also whether
there are any sanctions for non-compliance. These users should
know, most importantly of all, whether a simple and effective
means of obtaining a remedy is available if the rules are broken.
An online platform for privacy preference should in theory be
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capable of providing such information to users. The P3P vocab-
ulary as presently constituted, however, does not require the pro-
vision of information about sanctions or remedies to users.
Given that most Internet users are unlikely to alter any pre-
configured settings on their browser, the "default" position re-
garding a user's privacy preferences will have a major impact on
the overall level of online privacy protection. According to the
Article 29 Group, P3P should be implemented into browser tech-
nology with default positions that reflect the user's interest to
enjoy a high level of privacy protection, including the ability to
browse websites anonymously, without finding himself blocked
or inconvenienced in his attempts to gain access to sites. Where
an operator requests, as a condition for access to his site, the
provision of a profile of identifiable data, the user should be
asked each time for his consent for the provision of this informa-
tion to the particular site in question. Where a site does not
require such information, access could be seamless. The EU
group has suggested that the major browsing software manufac-
turers have a responsibility to implement P3P and OPS in a man-
ner that enhances rather than reduces levels of privacy protec-
tion.
CONCLUSIONS
Despite efforts to reconcile the conflicting approaches to
data protection in the Union and the United States, there re-
main major disagreements about the scope of privacy safeguards
and how they should be achieved. These differences stem from
divergent views about the role of government and public policy
in protecting individual privacy and the extent to which reliance
can be placed upon organizations to regulate their own activi-
ties. By contrast to the omnibus approach to personal data pro-
tection in the Union, the U.S. Administration eschews federal
action, except in specific sectors and remains committed to mar-
ket driven solutions.
These contrasting approaches are apparent in several re-
cent documents prepared in the Union and by the U.S. Adminis-
tration and U.S. business. There appears to be a reluctance on
the part of U.S. companies to acknowledge that privacy is a fun-
damental human right that needs to be reconciled with legiti-
mate business interests. Not only is there a distaste for legisla-
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tion, but also there appears to be an unwillingness among U.S.
business, even where self-regulatory codes have been introduced,
to accept internationally agreed standards on privacy. For the
Europeans, acceptance of the OECD Guidelines is a prerequisite
for concluding an agreement with the United States on the ade-
quacy issue. But, as John Mogg, Director-General of Directorate
General XV at the European Commission, stated in an address
to U.S. business leaders in Washington in April 1998, "most of
what we see is not meaningful .. .the industry codes we have
seen have no teeth."39 From a European perspective, it is inex-
plicable that while the U.S. Administration strongly supports the
global regulation of Internet activities relating to intellectual
property and taxation, it is opposed to the implementation of
privacy safeguards
The prospect of a fundamental shift in the United States in
favor of a comprehensive privacy law remains remote, although
threats to consumer privacy on the Internet could yet see a rever-
sal in U.S. political opinion. In the short term, many U.S. busi-
nesses believe that Article 26(2) of the EU directive, which pro-
vides for the creation of adequate safeguards by way of a con-
tract, may offer a solution, particularly for companies engaged in
a large number of similar transfers, while in the medium term
the United States hopes to convince the Europeans that industry
self-regulation is capable of providing genuinely effective protec-
tion. The European Commission has become more sympathetic
to these approaches during its discussions with the U.S. Adminis-
tration. It is by no means certain, however, that contracts and
self-regulation alone will be sufficient to persuade the Union
that U.S. companies are safe harbors for personal data on EU
citizens. Indeed, reliance on these provisions remain problem-
atic, and U.S. businesses will increasingly find themselves de-
pending upon a variety of options in efforts to convince the
Union that they have met the adequacy requirements.
From a European perspective, the key weakness of the U.S.
model lies in its approach to the transparency and access princi-
ples and the still half-hearted approach to enforcement. The
ability of individuals to control the use of their personal data, to
obtain access to it, to gain support in the exercise of their rights
and, ultimately, to obtain appropriate redress where rules have
39. Mogg, supra note 23.
1999] APPROACHES TO PERSONAL DATA PROTECTION 2049
been breached are perceived as essential to meeting the EU ade-
quacy criteria. The presence of an independent U.S. data pro-
tection entity at federal level, charged with powers to hear and
investigate complaints and, if necessary, to initiate judicial pro-
ceedings would, in European terms, represent a major step to-
wards achieving these objectives. The fragmentation of U.S. data
protection responsibilities is likely to become increasingly appar-
ent as the EU directive becomes operational and appropriate in-
stitutional arrangements in the United States would seem essen-
tial, both to defend its business interests and to resolve potential
political friction between the Union and the United States. Such
an entity would be an ideal interlocutor for European data pro-
tection authorities and for consumers seeking redress.
In practice, it seems probable that the privacy standards of
some major U.S. companies will be accepted as adequate by the
Union and will be designated as "safe harbors" in data protec-
tion terms, but some will fail to meet the criteria. From the out-
set the EU approach is likely to be cautious. Its first priority will
be to take action against specific transfers that pose particular
threats to personal privacy. Transfers involving sensitive data,
the human resource data bases of multi-nationals and sub-con-
tractors, operating on behalf of EU companies are all potential
targets. Secondly, the Union will "cherry pick" those U.S. busi-
nesses where the industry sector has well-established bodies and
regulatory systems that guarantee effective enforcement mecha-
nisms4 ° and gradually begin to recognize these sectors as ade-
quate. At the same time, the Union will be anxious to avoid rec-
ognizing a multiplicity of U.S. self-regulators in the same func-
tional area. The intention will be to stimulate other businesses
in the United States and other third countries to adopt adequate
standards of protection.
The position of the U.S. Department of Commerce remains
difficult, having both to represent recalcitrant U.S. business in-
terests and to engage in purposeful negotiations with the Union.
Its consultation documents have aimed to reconcile these con-
flicts, the most recent attempt being its International Safe Har-
40. Peter Q. Swire & Robert E. Litan, Avoiding a Showdown over EU Privacy Laws,
Brookings Institute Policy Brief No. 29 (Feb. 1998); Colin Bennett & C.D. Rabb, The
Adequacy of Privacy: The European Data Protection Directive and the North American Responses,
13 INFO. Soc'v 245 (1997).
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bor Principles, which are regarded by the U.S. Administration as
a further opportunity to establish a bilateral agreement with the
Union. However, recent experience implies that every effort will
be made to water down the Safe Harbor Principles to assuage
U.S. business interests. The European Commission is clearly
aware of this prospect and is likely to respond accordingly.
Agreement on the adequacy for EU purposes of the Safe Harbor
Principles is possible, but a number of important issues will need
to be resolved if this is to happen. It seems unlikely that the
Union will be prepared to accept the adequacy of a system based
solely on the self-certification of U.S. companies and which lacks
any means of redress for individuals, particularly if some of the
key data protection principles, such as the right of access, are
not properly guaranteed.
While the Union has committed itself to a regulatory ap-
proach to data protection, the architecture of the new informa-
tion technologies is dictated by U.S. companies. They dominate
the world market in ICT and are able to exert considerable lever-
age in determining the privacy protocols to be used in software.
Some observers have contended that in the context of myriad
data flows, regulation is not feasible. The configuration of infor-
mation systems, however, can be used to support legal solutions,
and the Union has recognized this through its support for pri-
vacy enhancing technologies. The links between data protection
law and the architecture of the World Wide Web are clearly evi-
dent in relation to P3P.4" It is uncertain, however, whether the
W3C will be willing to modify their recommendations and tech-
nical protocols to accommodate the values underpinning the EU
privacy model, although this is indispensable if national laws are
to be observed.
In addition to its involvement with the United States, the
Union is increasingly being drawn into bilateral discussions with
other states, which may, in the medium term, enable issues relat-
ing to transborder personal data flows to be considered in a mul-
tilateral context. Other non-EU states including Canada, Austra-
lia, Taiwan, Norway, Iceland, Hong Kong, Poland, Hungary, and
41. See Graham Greenleaf, Architecture v. Law, 21 U. OF NEW S. WALES L.J. 2, (Apr.
10, 1999) <http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/unswlj/issues.html# V21N2THEME>
(on file with the Fordham International Law Journal); Joel Reidenberg, Lex Informatica, 76
TEX. L. REv. 553 (1998).
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Switzerland either posses or are in the process of adopting pri-
vacy laws similar to the Union. In trading terms, Article XIV of
the General Agreement on Trade in Services4 2 ("GATS") legiti-
mizes the blocking of data transfers, and the Union has already
indicated its interest in improving on this arrangement to secure
a more binding multilateral agreement under the World Trade
Organization, similar to the Agreement on Trade-Related As-
pects of Intellectual Property Rights43 ("TRIPS Agreement") gov-
erning intellectual property. This could offer a way forward. In-
deed, from an EU perspective, public calls in the United States
to guarantee Internet privacy and the adoption of data protec-
tion laws by so many of the United States trading partners offer
perhaps the best chance of encouraging U.S. companies to ac-
knowledge the benefits of a global accord for safeguarding pri-
vacy for both business and consumers.
42. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, General Agreement of Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Annex 1B, LEGAL
INSTRUMENTs-REsuLTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1167 (1994).
43. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC,
LEGAL INSTRUMENTs-RsuLTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31; 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994).
